The interpretation of universally quantified DPs and singular definites in adverbially quantified sentences

This paper deals with the conditions under which singular definites, on the one hand, and universally quantified DPs, on the other hand, receive interpretations according to which the sets denoted by the NP-complements of the respective determiner vary with the situations quantified over by a Q-adverb. I show that in both cases such interpretations depend on the availability of situation predicates that are compatible with the presuppositions associated with the respective determiner, as co-variation in both cases comes about via the binding of a covert situation variable that is contained within the NP-complement of the respective determiner. Secondly, I offer an account for the observation that the availability of a co-varying interpretation is more constrained in the case of universally quantified DPs than in the case of singular definites, as far as word order is concerned. This is shown to follow from the fact that co-varying definites in contrast to universally quantified DPs are inherently focus-marked

Quantificational variability effects with plural definites : quantification over individuals or situations?

In this paper we compare the behaviour of adverbs of frequency (de Swart 1993) like usually with the behaviour of adverbs of quantity like for the most part in sentences that contain plural definites. We show that sentences containing the former type of Q-adverb evidence that Quantificational Variability Effects (Berman 1991) come about as an indirect effect of quantification over situations: in order for quantificational variability readings to arise, these sentences have to obey two newly observed constraints that clearly set them apart from sentences containing corresponding quantificational DPs, and that can plausibly be explained under the assumption that quantification over (the atomic parts of) complex situations is involved. Concerning sentences with the latter type of Q-adverb, on the other hand, such evidence is lacking: with respect to the constraints just mentioned, they behave like sentences that contain corresponding quantificational DPs. We take this as evidence that Q-adverbs like for the most part do not quantify over the atomic parts of sum eventualities in the cases under discussion (as claimed by Nakanishi and Romero (2004)), but rather over the atomic parts of the respective sum individuals

The influence of tense in adverbial quantification

We argue that there is a crucial difference between determiner and adverbial quantification. Following Herburger [2000] and von Fintel [1994], we assume that determiner quantifiers quantify over individuals and adverbial quantifiers over eventualities. While it is usually assumed that the semantics of sentences with determiner quantifiers and those with adverbial quantifiers basically come out the same, we will show by way of new data that quantification over events is more restricted than quantification over individuals. This is because eventualities in contrast to individuals have to be located in time which is done using contextual information according to a pragmatic resolution strategy. If the contextual information and the tense information given in the respective sentence contradict each other, the sentence is uninterpretable. We conclude that this is the reason why in these cases adverbial quantification, i.e. quantification over eventualities, is impossible whereas quantification over individuals is fine

The interpretative options of anaphoric complex demonstratives

In this paper, we present experimental evidence from a ‘yes’/‘no’ judgement task and two acceptability rating studies (Experiments 1a-c) for the claim made in Hinterwimmer (2019) that sentences with two anaphorically interpreted complex demonstratives are less acceptable than sentences with two anaphorically interpreted definite descriptions and sentences where one of the two previously introduced referents is picked up by a complex demonstrative, while the other one is picked up by a definite description. The results of Experiment 1a and 1b are in principle compatible with the account argued for in Hinterwimmer (2019), according to which the (potentially abstract) demonstrations presupposed by demonstratives may not have overlapping trajectories. However, sentences with two anaphorically interpreted complex demonstratives are not judged as unacceptable as would be expected if they involved a presupposition violation. Therefore, we propose an alternative, economy-based pragmatic account that builds on Ahn (2019) and Nowak (2019). The question of whether the observed pattern is more compatible with the account proposed by Hinterwimmer (2019) or the alternative pragmatic account is directly addressed in a further acceptability rating study (Experiment 1c). The design of that study is similar to that of Experiment 1b, but it includes as fillers both sentences clearly violating a presupposition and sentences violating a pragmatic constraint. Since the ratings for sentences containing two anaphorically interpreted complex demonstratives are closer to the ratings for sentences violating a pragmatic constraint than for sentences violating a presupposition, we conclude that the alternative pragmatic account is preferable to the account by Hinterwimmer (2019)

The metalinguistic use of vague predicates in conditionals

This paper deals with an at first sight surprising reading that indicative conditionals whose antecedents contain vague predicates receive under certain conditions. I argue that the existence of this reading can be explained if indicative conditionals are allowed to receive a special kind of metalinguistic interpretation. According to this reading, the worlds quantified over do not (possibly) differ from the world of evaluation with respect to some extralinguistic state of affairs, but only with respect to the standards according to which the vague predicates in the antecedents are interpreted. I show that the availability of the metalinguistic reading can be accounted for if both the epistemic modal bases and the selection function relative to which the worlds quantified over are determined are allowed to operate in a more flexible way than is standardly assumed

The Metalinguistic Use of Vague Predicates in Conditionals

Crucially, the sentences are compatible with a situation where there is more than one thing that the speaker hates, more than one person being drunk at last night's party, etc. The existence of these readings is unexpected, since standard assumptions about the meaning of conditionals in combination with ones about clefts lead us to expect readings according to which the conditions in (a) and (b) are fulfilled to be the only ones available: (a) The speaker is not sure whether an entity exists in the world of evaluation that satisfies the predicate introduced by the antecedent. If this is the case, there is only one such entity, and this entity is identical to the one mentioned in the consequent. Observe that such a reading is indeed the only one that is available to the structurally parallel examples in (A) Since the predicate in the antecedent is vague, the standard of interpretation can be manipulated, i.e. the positive value associated with the respective predicate can be set to the maximal degree. The respective vague predicates can be used metalinguistically within the antecedent. The cleft structure of the sentences enforces an interpretation according to which the entity occurring to the right of the copula is the only one that satisfies the antecedent predicate

Two kinds of perspective taking in narrative texts

In this paper, I argue for the existence of two distinct kinds of protagonists' perspective taking in narrative texts. The first, Free Indirect Discourse, represents conscious thoughts or utterances of protagonists and involves context shifting: All context-sensitive expressions with the exception of pronouns and tenses are interpreted with respect to the fictional context of some salient protagonist (Schlenker 2004; Sharvit 2008; Eckardt 2014, Maier 2015). The second, which I dub viewpoint shifting, does not necessarily represent conscious thoughts or utterances and it does not involve context shifting. Rather, a situation is described as it is perceived by a salient protagonist or in a way that reflects the doxastic state of such a protagonist, not with respect to the Common Ground (CG) of narrator and reader. While FID is only available at the root level, i.e. at the speech act level, viewpoint shifting is available at the level of finite matrix clauses

Demonstrative Pronouns as Anti-Logophoric Pronouns: An Experimental Investigation

In this paper we report the results of two experimental studies in which we tested the claim of Hinterwimmer and Bosch (2017) that German demonstrative pronouns are anti-logophoric pronouns: They avoid discourse referents as antecedents that function as perspectival centers. In both experiments we tested the interpretative options of demonstrative pronouns in text segments which were either perspectivally neutral or in which the narrator’s or a topical protagonist’s perspective was foregrounded. Taken together, the experimental results are most compatible with a slightly modified version of the analysis argued for in Hinterwimmer and Bosch (2017) according to which topical discourse referents in neutral narration automatically become perspectival centers.&nbsp

Free Indirect Discourse Meets Character Viewpoint Gestures

Contribution to Linguistic Evidence 202